CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ALGERIA

Proposal under item 1 of the agenda
of the Conference on Disarmament

"Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"

GE.98-62901

BACKGROUND

1. The algerian delegation considers that nuclear disarmament is an absolute priority for the Conference on Disarmament. A number of proposals have been made on this subject, all of them of undoubted interest. This working paper is designed to add substance to the debate, point to avenues which may be explored, and help in reaching decisions. It sets out a dual proposal on nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of fissile material, with a possible compromise formula.

2. The dual proposal on nuclear disarmament and fissile material draws on principles and rules which are broadly accepted, as well as positions, observations and views set out by delegations in the Conference on Disarmament.

3. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament constitute two inseparable and interacting dimensions which must be dealt with hand in hand.

The plan for non-proliferation is based on the NPT and includes other concomitant measures: the banning of nuclear testing, the granting of security assurances and the prohibition of fissile material. The NPT has now been extended indefinitely and possesses a strengthened review mechanism, nuclear testing has been banned under the CTBT and security assurances are being handled within an ad hoc committee established this year in the Conference on Disarmament, as well as being dealt, with or examined and considered in other settings (denuclearized zones and NPT).

4. It now remains to pursue two actions:

4.1. **To put the finishing touches to this plan for non-proliferation by accomplishing the last phase in the form of negotiations on fissile material; this is the purpose of proposal B.**

- This proposal has been drafted in the light of the need to initiate negotiations on a clear and unequivocal basis, following a common vision which is free of ambiguity as regards the scope and objectives of a treaty to ban fissile material.

- The logic underlying this proposal lies in a separation of the negotiations on future production and on stockpiles, which will lead to:

  *A treaty whose scope is limited to future production (the wording of the mandate contained in the Shannon report);

  *A protocol to govern stockpiles arising from production which predates the entry into force of the treaty and the dismantling of nuclear weapons under the START process. The negotiations will determine whether it is possible to opt for a protocol simply annexed to the body of the treaty, or an additionnal protocol to be opened for signature by

States , with its own preamble, operative part and entry-into-force clauses.

Such negotiations would make it possible to take into account the concerns expressed by the various delegations, to launch negotiations on a clear and unequivocal basis and to guarantee the smooth course of work in the ad hoc committee established for the purpose, by avoiding entanglement between the negotiations on future production and those on stockpiles, which are supposed to provide a mutual feedback.

4.2 **To outline the « plan for disarmament » through an in-depth examination of nuclear disarmament; this is the purpose of proposal A.**

- This in-depth exercise can be carried out effectively through:

*Negotiation of a convention involving a political commitment on the part of all States to the goal of nuclear disarmament. This legal instrument should, in our view, constitue the cornerstone of the « disarmament regime », in the same way that the NPT constitutes the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.

*Identification of pratical measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons. At this stage this would involve an identification exercise which would take account of the unilateral initiatives for nuclear arms limitation and bilateral efforts to reduce such weapons (the START process). This identification exercise could draw on numerous ideas and proposals (the proposal for a programme of nuclear disarmament put forward by 28 delegations from the G.21, the work of the Canberra Commission, etc.)

5. The algerian delegation considers that this dual proposal addresses the substance of item 1 on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in a balanced manner.

The algerian delegation considers also that for non-proliferation there exists a regime which requires somme finishing touches (the purpose of propsal B), and that disarmament must necessarily be provided with a regime which is similar and complementary to the former, which should be intiated in an adequate and appropriate manner (the purpose of proposal A).

Proposal A.

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee under item 1 of its agenda with the task, as first stage, of negotiating a multilateral, universal and legally binding convention commiting all States to the objective of nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

2. The ad hoc committee established in this way shall also strive to identify the measures which should be taken to attain this goal and thus safeguard and further strenghten nuclear non-proliferation, while taking due account of the uniltateral and bilateral initiatives being pursued in this field and proposals made on this subject.

3. As the measure to be taken immediately has already been identified (a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices), it shall be the subject of a separate decision by the CD.

4. The ad hoc committee shall report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1998 session.

Proposal B

1. In pursuance of decision CD/... of ..., and taking into account the Shannon report contained in document CD/1299 of 24 march 1995, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

2. The Conference directs the ad hoc committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

3. At the same time, the ad hoc committee shall be entrusted with the task of developing an international regime to govern stockpiles of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, which could take the form of a protocol annexed to the treaty referred to in paragraph 2 above, or an additionnal protocol.

4. The ad hoc committee shall report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1998 session.